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COMMENT
A Discussion of the Mechanics of the DMCA Safe
Harbors and Subpoena Power, as Applied in RIAA v.
Verizon Internet Services
Trevor A. Dutchert
INTRODUCTION
This comment begins with a brief synthesis of basic theories of
copyright infringement and a short history of litigation related to
Peer-To-Peer ("P2P") file sharing, which is followed by a general
explanation of the safe harbors of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA" or the "Act")1 and a more detailed explanation of the
DMCA subpoena power. It then examines and criticizes the analysis
and application of the DMCA subpoena power in Recording Industry
Association of America v. Verizon Internet Services,2 and concludes
that the holding in Verizon was incorrect because (a) the statutory
interpretation applied in that case was faulty, (b) the interpretation
given was plainly contrary to the stated legislative intent of the
DMCA, and (c) the final holding implicitly endorsed an
impermissible violation of the equal protection clause (as
incorporated into the due process clause) of the Fifth Amendment.
BACKGROUND
The dawn of the Internet has provided substantial benefits to
society as a whole through economic globalization, electronic
t The author is a student at Santa Clara University School of Law, Editor-in-Chief of
the Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal, a student representative on the
Advisory Board to the High Tech Law Institute, a Dean's Appointee to the Ingram American
Inn of Court, and a J.D. candidate for 2005. He previously earned a B.A. magna cur laude in
Management with a minor in International Marketing from Menlo College. He would like to
thank Professors Tyler Ochoa and Bradley Joondeph for their invaluable insight and
commentary during the drafting of this paper, and his family for their tireless patience and
support. Copyright © 2004 Trevor A. Dutcher.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2004).
2. 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004).
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commerce, online communication, and instantaneous access to a
plethora of information. Along the way, however, it has also given
rise to substantial legal issues. This article focuses on P2P file
sharing technology, its facilitation of copyright infringement, and the
battle that the recording industry has faced in trying to enforce its
copyrights. The Record Industry easily prevailed over Napster,
showing that due to Napster's centralized indexing function, the
company was guilty of contributory infringement for the acts of its
users.3 But as distributed architectures became more popular among
P2P software vendors, and P2P vendors removed the indexing
function from their own servers and pushed it out to the individual
users, companies like Grokster and Morpheus were able to escape
secondary liability.4  Such advances in technology left copyright
holders without a remedy against the vendors of such applications,
and relegated them to lawsuits against the direct infringers, the file
traders themselves. The record industry initially pursued these users
by use of the DMCA subpoena power, but as is discussed below,
plaintiffs are now forced to institute Doe actions against file traders
and appear before a judge before any such subpoena may be issued or
any subscriber information may be obtained.
I. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, GENERALLY
To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a Plaintiff must
show ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied
protected expression. 5  Three main theories exist under which a
defendant may be liable for copyright infringement: direct
infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious infringement.
Direct infringement exists when the defendant himself is engaged in
infringing activity.6 A plaintiff may also sue a party other than the
3. See A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding, in essence, that because the
Napster file sharing system ran through a central index maintained by the company, the
company could be held liable on a theory of secondary liability for the acts that its users
engaged in). For an explanation of secondary liability under copyright law see infra Part 1.
4. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046
(C.D. Cal. 2003), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480) (holding
that because there was no central function to Grokster's file sharing technology, the company
neither had the right and ability to supervise its users, nor did it materially contribute to its
users' infringing activity, and it therefore could not be held secondarily liable for copyright
infringement). For further explanation of the significance of these findings see infra Part 1.
5. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
6. The statutory definition of copyright infringement is:
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direct infringer on theories of contributory or vicarious infringement.
To prevail on either of these theories, a plaintiff must first make a
threshold showing of direct infringement by someone other than the
defendant.7 Once that threshold is met, a third-party may be liable for
contributory infringement when, with knowledge of the direct
infringing activity, he "induces, causes, or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct of another." 8  A third-party may be liable for
vicarious infringement when "he has a right and ability to supervise
the [direct] infringing activity and has a direct financial interest in
such activities." 9  There is no requirement that a party have
knowledge of the infringing activity to be liable on a theory of
vicarious infringement. 10  This is equally true for direct
infringement." Hence only contributory infringement requires an
element of knowledge; direct and vicarious infringement of copyright
are strict liability offenses.
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section
106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in
violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as
the case may be. For purposes of this chapter (other than section 506), any
reference to copyright shall be deemed to include the rights conferred by section
106A(a). As used in this subsection, the term "anyone" includes any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and
any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions
of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental
entity.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2004).
7. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984).
8. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
9. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
10. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)).
11. The statute provides:
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds,
that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may
reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2004) (emphasis added). The inverse inference, then, is that even
without knowledge or constructive knowledge that his act constitutes infringement, a person can
be held directly liable in copyright, albeit to a potentially lesser degree than if he had such
knowledge.
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II. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT, GENERALLY
"The DMCA was enacted [in 1998] both to preserve copyright
enforcement on the Internet and to provide immunity to service
providers from copyright... liability for 'passive,' 'automatic'
actions in which a service provider's system engages through a
technological process initiated by another without the knowledge of
the service provider." 12 "Service providers" are afforded four safe
harbors, and the term service provider is defined broadly in the Act.
The Act states "[a]s used in subsection [512](a), 'service provider'
means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among
points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received."'13 It
then says "[a]s used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term
'service provider' means a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity
described in subparagraph (A).' 4  The second definition includes
providers of more than just Intemet connections, but presumably any
type of service offered over the Internet.'
5
The first safe harbor, "Transitory Digital Network
Communications," excludes service providers from liability for
damages and limits the scope of injunctive relief arising from
copyright infringement for purely passive transmissions over the
service provider's infrastructure, provided that (i) someone other than
the service provider initiated the transmission, (ii) the transmission is
carried out by automated technical processes without selection of the
material being made by the service provider, (iii) the service provider
does not actively select the recipients of the transmission, (iv) no copy
of the transmission is made for any period longer than necessary to
complete the transmission and only the intended recipient may access
the transmission, and (v) the content of the transmission is not
modified by the service provider.'
6
12. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 649).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (2004).
14. Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
15. By way of illustration, AOL is a traditional provider of Internet connections that
meets both definitions of service providers, while a company that offers online file storage only
meets the broader definition even if the company does not provide the link that allows customers
to connect to the Internet.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2004).
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The second safe harbor, "System Caching," limits, under certain
circumstances, liability for the intermediate and temporary storage of
transmissions on the service provider's network.1 7 This ostensibly
addresses the issue of random access memory copies raised by MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.' 8  The third safe harbor,
"Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users,"
limits, under certain circumstances, liability for service providers
when infringing files are actually stored on their own physical
networks provided they (i) have no actual knowledge of such storage,
(ii) no constructive knowledge of such storage, or (iii) upon obtaining
knowledge, they act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the
files.1 9 The fourth safe harbor, "Information location tools," limits,
under certain circumstances, liability for service providers who aid
their users in locating infringing material by maintaining an index,
directory, reference, pointer, or hypertext link, provided that the
service provider does not have actual knowledge that the material or
activity is infringing, does not have constructive knowledge that the
material or activity is infringing, or upon obtaining such knowledge,
acts expeditiously to remove access to such infringing material.20
To take advantage of any of these safe harbors, the service
provider must also satisfy several general requirements. It must first
adopt, implement, and inform its users of a policy providing for the
termination of repeat infringers. 2' In order to identify and to protect
copyrighted works, the provider must also accommodate "standard"
technical measures used by copyright owners.22  Notably, service
providers are not required to pro-actively monitor or take any positive
action to seek out infringing material.23 For service providers to moor
in the safe harbors provided by § 512(c) and § 512(d), however, there
is one final requirement that the service provider not receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity where
17. See id. § 512(b).
18. 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that copies of software loaded into a
computer's random access memory, which is necessary for use of the software, constitutes a
copy that is fixed for purposes of copyright infringement). For extended discussion of the issue
and fallout from MA!, see CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 500-01 (6th ed. 2003 & Supp.
2004).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2004).
20. See id. § 512(d).
21. See id. § 512(i)(1).
22. See id. § 512(i)(2).
23. Seeid § 512(m).
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the service provider has the right and the ability to control such
activity.
24
III. THE DMCA SUBPOENA POWER
Given the anonymity inherent in Internet communication,
copyright holders require cooperation from an Internet Service
Provider ("ISP") to obtain the identity of individual infringers before
they can effectively sue them. At best, a copyright holder can identify
a user of P2P applications by his or her Internet Protocol ("IP")
address, 25 and only the ISP is in a position to reveal the true identity
of that person so that a complaint may be filed against him.26 The
provisions of § 512(h) of the DMCA allow copyright holders, after
providing particularized information, to obtain subpoenas from the
clerk of the court.27 The subpoenas may be presented to the ISP to
compel disclosure of the identity of the person behind the IP address
so that the copyright holder may then properly bring suit against
him.28
It is worth noting that these safe harbors are non-exclusive and
refer not to types of service providers, but rather activities engaged in
or uses made by the service provider's subscribers of the services it
provides. A service provider may seek refuge in § 512(a) in a lawsuit
alleging passive transport of data by its subscriber, yet the same ISP
could nonetheless assert the § 512(c) safe harbor in a separate case
alleging that a user stored infringing material on the ISP's server.
The choice of which safe harbor should apply is therefore determined
not by the form of the ISP, but by the alleged infringing act of the
individual subscriber.
24. See id. § 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2). The language in these two clauses seems to state, in
essence, that the safe harbors of subsections 512(c) and 512(d) provide no defense to a service
provider who is otherwise guilty of vicarious infringement. For the vicarious infringer to seek
refuge in the safe harbors of § 512, then, he seemingly would be required to satisfy the
requirements of either § 512(a) or (b).
25. Every computer connected to the Internet is assigned a unique number known as an
Internet Protocol ("IP") address. See GOOGLE, INC., ADWORDS COMMON TERMS at
https://adwords.google.com/select/glossary.html#i (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). The IP address,
therefore, is the unique identifier of each computer connected to the Internet and is the
mechanism by which other computers locate and communicate with it.
26. The ISP owns the IP address and in a sense "leases" it to its customer so that the
customer can connect to the Internet. Given the IP address, the ISP can match the IP address
with the subscriber name.
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2004). The actual requirements are discussed at greater
length below. See infra Part IV.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2004).
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IV. RIAA V. VERIZONINTERNETSER VICES, INC.-APPLICATION OF THE
SUBPOENA POWER
In a series of highly publicized cases, the record industry has
aggressively defended its copyrights. After it became clear that
companies like Grokster and Morpheus could escape secondary
liability for the acts of their users due to the decentralized nature of
their applications, attention was turned to the individuals engaged in
direct infringement. Taking advantage of the provisions in § 512(h),
the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") began
obtaining DMCA subpoenas seeking the identities of individual P2P
users from ISPs who provided the users' Internet connections. 29 The
first wave of subpoenas was sent to ISPs in July 2003 to identify and
contact customers who were alleged copyright infringers. 30 Later that
year, the RIAA filed 382 more lawsuits (261 in September, plus 80 in
October, plus 41 in December of 2003).31 While most ISPs complied
with the subpoenas, Verizon Internet Services refused to comply with
two separate subpoenas. 32  At the enforcement proceedings for the
29. Daphne Eviatar, Changing It's Tune: If The Music Industry Wants to Survive Online
Piracy, In-House Lawyers at the Record Companies Must Adapt, IP LAW & BUSINESS, Nov. 5,
2003, available at http://www.ipww.com/texts/tunest 103.html.
30. The Impact of Recording Industry Suits Against Music File Swappers, Data Memo
from Pew Interet Project and comScore (Jan. 4, 2004), at 5, available at
http://207.21.232.103/pdfs/PIPFile SwappingMemo 01 04.pdf.
31. Id.
32. Section 512(i)(1)(A) provides, as a condition to eligibility for the safe harbor
provisions, that a service provider must "adopt[] and reasonably implement[], and inform[]
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network ofl] a policy that
provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of
the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers." 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A)
(2004) (emphasis added).
Notably, however, the statute does not define the term "repeat infringer." So the
question remains as to what constitutes repeat infringement. Would the simple act of sharing a
single infringing file with two separate users suffice? What about sharing two separate
infringing files with one user? Or are two convictions required? A plain text reading of that
section suggests that two infringing distributions of a single file, or the infringing distribution of
two separate files should be sufficient to classify the user a "repeat infringer," thereby creating a
duty in the ISP to terminate that user's service pursuant to its own policy.
Might it be argued that because Verizon actively defended its subscribers and
shielded them from the DMCA subpoenas without terminating the users' service, that it had
failed to "reasonably implement" a repeat infringer policy as required by § 512(i)(1)(A), thereby
making the safe harbors unavailable, and exposing Verizon to suit for contributory or vicarious
infringement for the actions of the users it sought to protect? See In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 657-59 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (stating that because Aimster's encryption
technology prevented identification of infringing users, Aimster could not be adequately
informed of "repeat infringers," the policy was not reasonably implemented, and the safe
harbors were therefore not available to it); cf Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiI, LLC, 2004 WL
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first subpoena, Verizon argued that, based on a prolix interpretation of
§ 512(h) and its interaction with language in § 512(a)-(d), the DMCA
subpoena provision did not apply to Verizon as a mere provider of
passive transport of data.33  Verizon also questioned the
constitutionality of § 512(h).34 The constitutional arguments called
into question the court's Article III power to issue the subpoena in the
absence of an actual case or controversy, and referred to the First
Amendment freedom to engage in anonymous speech. The court
declined to discuss the constitutional issues because the issues had not
been fully briefed by Verizon, and it disagreed with Verizon's
analysis of the general applicability of § 512(h). 35  The motion to
enforce the subpoena was granted.
In the enforcement hearings for the second subpoena, Verizon
fully developed its constitutional arguments based on Article III and
First Amendment grounds, but the court was unmoved. Equally
unmoved by Verizon's construction of the statute, which interpreted
§ 512 as inapplicable to Verizon, the court ordered the second
subpoena enforced as well. 36 On appeal, however, Verizon won the
day, as the circuit court found that the DMCA subpoena in question
was not enforceable against Verizon. 37  Although the victory was
touted by Verizon as a win for privacy and safety,38 the holding in
fact turned solely on statutory interpretation.
1798295, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (suggesting that an infringer is not a repeat infringer-or at
least that a repeat infringer policy is not activated-unless the ISP has received multiple notices
of alleged infringing activity; stating in dicta that, "an Internet service provider who receives
repeat notifications that substantially comply with the requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A) about one
of its clients, but does not terminate its relationship with the client, has not reasonably
implemented a repeat infringer policy"). It seems odd that two notifications are required to label
a user a "repeat infringer" under this case, and it would seemingly drive copyright holders to
send two notices back to back, instead of only one, thereby doubling the amount of paperwork
that copyright holders must submit and that ISPs must process, in efforts to ensure that the ISP's
"repeat infringer" policy is called into play. Nobody wins under that interpretation.
33. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd
on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
34. Id. at 42 n. 17. Verizon did not challenge the section directly, but only alluded to the
"questionable nature of its constitutionality" in a footnote.
35. Id. at 42, 44.
36. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd on
other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
37. RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004).
38. See Press Release, Verizon, Inc., Verizon Wins Fight to Protect Internet Safety and
Privacy (Dec. 19, 2003) available at
http://newscenter.verizon.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=83104 (last visited Oct. 18,
2004).
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The court, applying complex and arguably strained statutory
interpretation, found that the DMCA subpoena power did not apply to
Verizon as a provider of mere transport services, that the subpoena
was improperly issued, and that Verizon need not comply.
39
In order to obtain a DMCA subpoena, a copyright owner must
file with the clerk of the court (i) a copy of a notification described in
§ 512(c)(3)(A),4 ° (ii) a proposed subpoena, and (iii) a sworn
declaration that the subpoena is sought to identify an infringer and
that the identity will only be used to protect the rights of the copyright
owner. 41 "If the notification filed satisfies the provisions of
subsection [512](c)(3)(A), the proposed subpoena is in proper
form ... [and] the clerk shall expeditiously issue the...
subpoena.... ,,42
In order for the notice to "be effective under.. . subsection
[(c)(3)(A)], a notification of claimed infringement must be a written
communication... that includes substantially the following:" (i) a
physical or electronic signature; (ii) identification of the copyrighted
work claimed to have been infringed; (iii) identification of the
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to
be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to locate the material; (iv) contact information of the
complaining party; and (v) a statement of a good faith belief that the
alleged infringing use is not authorized by the copyright holder.43
Both Verizon and the court seized on the third requirement,
particularly the phrase "and information reasonably sufficient to
permit the service provider to locate the material." 44 Verizon argued,
and the court agreed, that because the files were stored on the users'
computers or removable storage media, and not on Verizon's network
39. See Verizon, 351 F.3d 1229.
40. In practice, the notification provided in § 512(c)(3)(A) must first be served on the ISP
in question. Such notification puts the ISP on notice of the infringing material. In order to avail
itself of the safe harbors in § 512 and avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, the
ISP must then take reasonable steps to remove or disable access to the infringing material. This
is pursuant to the so-called "notice and takedown" provision. After sending notice to the ISP,
the Plaintiff must then attach a copy of that notice to its proposed subpoena to the clerk of the
court, in order to have the subpoena issued.
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A)-(C) (2004). The party seeking the subpoena must first
notify the ISP of the alleged infringing material, and include a copy of that notification in its
request for the subpoena.
42. Id. § 512(h)(4).
43. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A).
44. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
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or computers, Verizon was not able to "locate" the material in
question. Without an ability to locate the material, notice described in
subsection (c)(3)(A) could never be effective, and without effective
notice, the subpoena could not issue as per subsection (h)(4). 45 The
court's holding, distilled to its essence, is that P2P users are not
reachable by the DMCA subpoena process outlined in § 5 12(h).
The conclusion was based on two basic premises: Service
providers who would otherwise qualify for the safe harbor of § 512(a)
(those alleged to be engaging in pure transport activity) are always
unable to "locate" material that is stored on a user's computer and, in
any event, § 512(h) simply does not apply to ISPs who are merely
acting as a conduit for transmission activity described in § 512(a).
Each of these premises will be rebutted in turn below.
A. Rebutting the Argument That the Files Cannot Be Located
Ignoring momentarily that the five requirements of § 512(c)(3)
need only be "substantially 'A6 met, this comment will demonstrate
that the requirements were completely met. "Locate" simply means
to "seek out and determine the location of' 4 7 or said another way, to
ascertain the whereabouts of. By using a copy of the P2P application
that the complaining party had used to obtain the IP address in the
first place, Verizon could have connected to the alleged infringer's
computer by using the IP address supplied by the complaining party
in its subpoena. The complaining party could include the name of the
particular P2P software it used to find the alleged infringer as part of
the "information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider
to locate the material" as required by subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii). Once
connected, Verizon could verify that the user is in fact sharing the file
at issue. By doing so, Verizon would have effectively "sought out
and determined the location of' the offending file-it would be
located on the computer using the IP address in question. Notably
absent from the language of subsection (c)(3)(A), which describes
"effective notice," is a requirement that the ISP locate and remove the
file, locate and obtain dominion over the file, or locate the file on its
own internal servers. It need only locate the file-the text is clear.
It may be argued that expecting Verizon to use a P2P application
to navigate a P2P network to locate the file would be unreasonably
45. See RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004).
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
47. MIRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 730 (1 Ith ed. 2003).
Vol. 21
2005] DMCA SAFE HARBORS AND SUBPOENA POWER 503
burdensome; but navigating a P2P network to find a file on a user's
computer is no different than Verizon navigating its own internal
network to find the file on an internal server-the exercise is the
same, the only difference is which software client is used in the
navigation (Refer to the Appendix for an illustration of how this can
be accomplished). Therefore, given the IP address of the alleged
infringer and the title of the P2P software the user used, Verizon
could have "located" the file pursuant to the requirements of
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
B. But Don't IP Addresses Change?
In short, the answer is "sometimes." There are two main
methods of allocating IP addresses: static and dynamic. A static IP
address is a number that is assigned to a computer by an ISP to be its
permanent address on the Internet. 48 This is analogous to the street
address on your house. The address on your house does not change
from day to day and people can always find it with relative ease.
Many IP addresses, however, are assigned dynamically from a
pool.49 Many corporate networks and online services economize on
the number of IP addresses they use by sharing a pool of IP addresses
among a large number of users. 50 "If you're an America Online user,
for example, your IP address [can] vary from one logon session to the
next because AOL is assigning it to you from a pool that is much
smaller than AOL's [total] base of subscribers.'
To use another analogy, dynamic IP addresses are more like
hotel rooms than houses, and an ISP that only owns 100 IP addresses
can be compared to a hotel that only has 100 rooms. When a user
logs on to the ISP using a dynamic IP address, he "checks in" to a
"room" which is the IP address that is dynamically assigned to him
for the duration of his "stay." When he logs off the service or shuts
down his computer, he might "check out" of that "room," making it
available for someone else who wants to check in after him. The next
time he "checks in" he might get a different "room." This system
48. SEARCHWEBSERVICES.COM DEFINITIONS, STATIC IP ADDRESS/DYNAMIC IP
ADDRESS, at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci520967,00.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
49. SEARCHWEBSERVICES.COM DEFINITIONS, IP ADDRESS, at
http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid26_gci212381,00.html (last visited
Oct. 3, 2004).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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permits the ISP to serve a gross number of customers that is larger
than the actual number of "rooms" available.
A slightly more detailed discussion of the mechanics of dynamic
addressing, however, is warranted.52 When a computer is attempting
to enter a network in an environment using Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol ("DHCP"), the computer must first "lease" an
IP address so that it may be identified on, and communicate with, the
network.53 To obtain a lease, the DHCP client initiates a conversation
with a DHCP server using a series of messages. 54 The DHCP client
first makes a request for an IP address. 55  The DHCP server then
responds with an "offer., 56 The client will accept the offer, and the
server will reply with a finalization of the transaction. 57 The client
computer will then be identified by that address until the address is
released or the lease expires.58
By default, a lease lasts for eight days, 59  but system
administrators can configure the leases to last for longer or shorter
durations.6 ° It is possible that a lease can be set to last indefinitely.61
Even where the lease is configured to last for less than an infinite
duration, it does not necessarily expire after that duration passes. The
client will attempt to renew the lease when 50% of the duration has
passed.62 So if the duration of the lease is set to eight days, the client
will attempt to contact the DHCP server to renew the lease after four
days. If the client successfully contacts the DHCP server and the
lease is still available, the lease will be renewed for eight more days.63
52. For the sake of simplicity, this section assumes use of DHCP on a Microsoft
Windows platform. DHCP stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol and is the
mechanism by which dynamic IP addresses are managed within a network.
53. MICROSOFT, INC., How DHCP WORKS, at
http://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/WindowsServ/2003/all/techref/en-
us/Default.asp?url=/Resources/Documentation/windowsserv/2003/all/techref/en-
us/w2k3tr dhcphow.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. MICROSOFT, INC., supra note 53.
60. Id.
61. Id. The effect in such a case would be the same as if a static IP address was used.
62. Id.
63. Id. If, for example, the computer is shut down on day three of the eight-day lease,
and restarted on day nine, the client will attempt to contact the DHCP server to renew the lease.
Technically the lease is expired, but if the address has not yet been reallocated to another
computer, renewal is still possible. If the address is not available on the other hand, then a new
[ ol. 2 1
2005] DMCA SAFE HARBORS AND SUBPOENA POWER 505
Local storage of DHCP information allows the client computer to
"remember" its DHCP configuration and IP address even after it shuts
down. If the computer is restarted before the lease expires, it will
attempt to first renew the lease of its previous IP address before trying
64to acquire a new one.
Now consider that many high-speed Internet connections such as
cable-modem or DSL are "always-on." There is no need to dial-up to
an ISP with these types of services; if the computer is on, then it is
connected to the Internet. This means that the lease on an IP address,
technically, could be renewed in perpetuity, and even a computer
using a dynamic IP address could theoretically have the same IP
address for weeks or months or more if it is not shut down or
otherwise disconnected from the network for such a duration that
would allow the lease to expire without a successful renewal. The
foregoing discussion illustrates that although IP addresses can
change, such a possibility does not justify a per se conclusion that it
would be impossible to "locate" the file. Even if a subpoena
containing a given IP address for an alleged infringer is delivered and
some time passes before anyone at the ISP attempts to "locate" the
file that is complained of, it is still perfectly reasonable that the ISP
may be able to locate that file at that IP address after the passage of
some time because the user's IP address will not necessarily have
changed.
C. Completing the Proof That Effective Notice is Possible
To completely address the notice requirement,
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), as a whole, requires "[i]dentification of the
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity and that is to be removed or to which access is to
be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to locate the material. 65  The disjunctive "or"
indicates that the notice is effective if (a) the ISP is able to remove the
file, or (b) the ISP is able to disable other people's access to the file.
Logically, it must then follow that the ISP may disable access to the
file by some method other than by removing it. A contrary reading
address will be assigned and the computer will be known by that new address moving forward.
See id.
64. MICROSOFT, INC., supra note 53. If the renewal is unsuccessful, the computer will
then request a new IP address in its place. Id.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2004) (emphasis added).
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would render the phrase "or to which access is to be disabled" mere
surplusage.
66
Having obtained the IP address of the offending host and having
already located the file, the ISP could then potentially terminate the
host's Internet access. By doing so, the ISP could "disable access to"
the file.67 The ISP is, therefore, able to "locate the offending
material ... to which access is to be disabled"; hence the whole of
(c)(3)(A)(iii) would be satisfied. Because the balance of the notice
provisions were also satisfied, effective notice was given and the
subpoena could have been issued.
The court rejected a similar argument offered by the RIAA.
Pointing to semantic differences between subsections (j)(1)(A)(i) and
(j)(1)(A)(ii), the court reasoned that Congress considered disabling an
individual's access to the infringing material and disabling access to
the Internet to be different remedies for the protection of copyright
owners, the former blocking access to the infringing material on the
offender's computer6 8 and the latter more broadly blocking the
66. "It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every
word, clause, and sentence of a statute." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2002) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955)).
"A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will
be... superfluous .. " Id. (citing Office of Consumers' Counsel v. F.E.R.C., 783 F.2d 206
(D.C. Cir. 1986)). "No clause [or] sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous... if the
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute." Id.
(citing Tax Appeal of County of Maui v. KM Hawaii, Inc., 915 P.2d 1349 (Haw. 1996)). "The
legislature is presumed to have intended to avoid surplusage in the words and sentences and
therefore it is permissible to interpret the statute to avoid such a pitfall." Id. at § 46:07 (citing
Commonwealth v. Scott, 546 A.2d 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
67. Critics may view this as a Draconian proposition, that is, that terminating a user's
Internet access for "allegedly" sharing a copyrighted work is an unjust solution. To be clear,
that is not what I am suggesting. I am merely illustrating that the ISP is able to "locate" the
material "to which access is to be disabled." Because the ISP can "locate" the material, and
because it is capable of "disabling access to it," then notice can be properly served. Whether it
actually disables access or not is only relevant to analyzing whether its termination policy is
reasonably implemented and whether it has complied with the notice and takedown provisions
in order to avail itself of the safe harbors generally. That issue is separate from the issuance of
subpoenas. The statute does not require the ISP to remove the file in order for notice to be
effective.
68. This premise seems to create an inconsistency. In the court's own words, "the
legislative history of the DMCA betrays no awareness whatsoever that Internet users might be
able directly to exchange files containing copyrighted works. That is not surprising; P2P
software was not even a glimmer in anyone's eye when the DMCA was enacted." RIAA, Inc. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309
(2004) (citing In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd
on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted)).
If Congress had not conceived of P2P technology, why would it need to "block access
to infringing material on the offender's computer" as the court asserts is the rationale behind the
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offender's access to the Internet. 69 These distinct statutory remedies
satisfied the court that terminating a subscriber's account is not the
same as removing or disabling access by others to the infringing
material resident on the subscriber's computer.70  The court stated,
"[w]here different terms are used in a single piece of legislation, the
court must presume that Congress intended the terms [to] have
different meanings., 71 This statement, however, proves too much; it
only answers the question of "must access be disabled by termination
of the user's Internet connection; that is, is termination of the users
connection the only way to disable access to the file?" Clearly the
answer is "no" in the larger context of § 512 as a whole. It does not,
however, compel an answer in the negative to the question of "may
access be disabled by termination of the user's Internet connection?"
Certainly it may.
Two terms can have different meanings without being, of
necessity, incompatible. They might mean different things, yet one
can be a means while the other an end. It is unclear to this author
why the termination of one user's Internet access cannot be a
perfectly effective method of disabling other users' access to the
infringing files he hosts. The court's view in this respect seems to be
somewhat myopic, unnecessarily focusing on the single computer,
and that particular user's access to his own file. It does not take into
account that disabling the host from the network does in fact "disable
access" to that file by all the millions of other users who are
downloading it. It no longer exists anywhere on ISP's network or at
any point accessible using their network, and for users searching for
the file to download it, their access has been disabled.
"disabling access remedy?" A more reasonable assumption is that disabling Internet access was
thought of as a remedy to keep the user from using his Internet access to post, upload, or
broadcast infringing material in the future. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (enjoining defendant from
posting unauthorized copies of L. Ron Hubbard's copyrighted works on an Internet bulletin
board). Disabling Internet access of P2P file traders would be entirely consistent with such
intent because it disables access by others, and it keeps the subscriber from
broadcasting/distributing files over the network just as it would keep him from uploading the
files to a bulletin board service.
69. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1235 (comparing "§ 512(j)(l)(A)(i) (authorizing injunction
restraining ISP from providing access to infringing material [on its servers]) with ...
§ 512j)(1)(A)(ii) (authorizing injunction restraining ISP from providing access to a subscriber
or account holder.., who is engaging in infringing activity... by terminating the accounts of
the subscriber or account holder)" (internal quotations omitted)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. Dep't of Transp., 791 F.2d 202, 205
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
508 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J.
More importantly, however, the court's discussion of
§ 5120)(1)(A) seems entirely misplaced. Subsection (j)(1)(A) applies
to service providers who qualify for the safe harbors of § 512(b)-
(d).72 Verizon, in this instance, clearly belonged under the auspices of
the safe harbor provided by § 512(a). Section 512(j)(1)(B), which
specifically addresses remedies against ISPs for § 512(a)-type
activity, provides two possible orders for injunctive relief. Section
512(j)(1)(B) states:
If the service provider qualifies for the limitation on remedies
described in subsection (a), the court may only grant injunctive
relief in one or both of the following forms: (i) An order
restraining the service provider from providing access to a
subscriber or account holder of the service provider's system or
network who is using the provider's service to engage in infringing
activity and is identified in the order, by terminating the accounts
of the subscriber or account holder that are specified in the order,
or (ii) An order restraining the service provider from providing
access, by taking reasonable steps specified in the order to block
access, to a specific, identified, online location outside the United
States.
73
So, in fact, the only remedy a court could order against a service
provider who qualifies under the provisions of § 512(a), like Verizon,
is in fact an order to terminate Internet access by a United States user,
or prevent access to a foreign user via the conduit that it provides.
Verizon could have "located" the infringing files, it could have
disabled other users' access to the files, and it could have done so in a
manner entirely consistent with the remedy expressly available
against it; therefore the notice provisions of § 512(c)(3)(A), and hence
§ 512(h) were satisfied in their entirety.74
The court, however, went one step further to conclude that the
§ 512(h) subpoena power simply does not extend to Service Providers
who do not engage in storage activities. 75 It reasoned that subsections
512(b) and (d) are storage functions.76 As such, they are, like the ISP
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A) (2004). This subsection begins with "With respect to
conduct other than that which qualifies for the limitation on remedies set forth in subsection
(a) .. ." Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 512(j)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
74. Such a reading would also be consistent with the "termination policy" that is required
by the DMCA as a prerequisite to an ISP's eligibility for the safe harbors to begin with. See
supra text accompanying note 32.
75. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1237.
76. Id.
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activities described in § 512(c) and unlike the transmission functions
listed in § 512(a), susceptible to the notice and take down regime of §
512(b)-(d), of which the subpoena power of § 512(h) is an integral
part.7 7  At this time, the reader might ask himself if the subpoena
power of § 512(h) really is an integral part of the "notice and
takedown regime" 78 of the safe harbors.
The safe harbors are concerned with providing shelter for ISPs
from secondary liability arising from the acts of their subscribers.
The subpoena power, on the other hand, gives plaintiffs a mechanism
to identify and seek a remedy against direct infringers. These are
separate tools. An ISP may very well receive notice of an allegedly
infringing use that is sufficient for a subpoena to issue; but whether
the ISP actually acts upon that notice by "taking down" the material
in order to avail itself of the safe harbor is a wholly separate issue and
should have no bearing on the subpoena analysis. As will be
discussed momentarily, the immunity of the safe harbor provisions
was granted in exchange for compliance with the subpoena process.
This further suggests that the safe harbors and the subpoena power are
completely discrete and separable concepts and not one inextricably
intertwined all-or-nothing "regime." The court went on to say:
[w]e think it clear, therefore, that the cross-references to
§ 512(c)(3) in §§ 512(b)-(d) demonstrate that § 512(h) applies to
an ISP storing infringing material on its servers in any capacity -
whether as a temporary cache of a web page created by the ISP per
§ 512(b), as a web site stored on the ISP's server per § 512(c), or
as an information locating tool hosted by the ISP per § 512(d) -
77. Id.
78. Four separate elements of § 512 seem to be conflated into one "thing" by use of the
colloquial phrase "notice and take down regime" as the term has gained popularity in common
parlance. There is "notice," defined in detail at §512(c)(3), which serves two functions: (i) to
put ISPs on notice so that they might take action to avail themselves of the safe harbors or else
risk a lawsuit for secondary infringement, and separately, (ii) to satisfy an element of the burden
placed upon plaintiffs in pursuit of a subpoena as described in § 512(h) to initiate an action for
direct infringement. There is also "takedown" which is a second element that requires the ISP to
remove or disable access to the purportedly infringing material it has been given "notice" of if it
wishes to moor in the safe harbors of § 512(b)-(d) and avoid secondary liability; there is the
"immunity" provided by the safe harbor if both "notice" and "take down" are satisfied; and there
is the "subpoena" power itself, described in § 512(h) which compels the ISP to identify the
direct infringer. "Notice and takedown," if it is a regime at all, would seem only to govern
whether an ISP can moor in a safe harbor, by showing that after obtaining notice, it took down
the offending material. It seems that the subpoena power is not integral to this process at all,
which is discussed at further length below.
510 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH _.J.
and does not apply to an ISP routing infringing material to or from
a personal computer owned and used by a subscriber.
79
While the inference is articulated with precision and force,
saying that something is clear, no matter how emphatically you say it,
does not necessarily make it so. The plain language of § 512(h)
requires only that notice be given to the service provider (not just the
service provider who stores users' data). Moreover, a revisitation of
the text of § 512(k) is informative-it defines "service provider" in
terms of "transmission," "routing," "connections for digital online
communication," "online services" and "network access." While
"online services," arguably, could mean "storage," applying the
maxim of ejusdem generis, it ought to be interpreted as a
telecommunications-type service in order to give it a meaning
consistent with the terms that surround it. This would suggest that the
safe harbors created in § 512(a)-(d) were aimed primarily at
protecting transport providers (conduits) against liability arising from
the use made by their subscribers of the infrastructure that they
provide, including pure transport or varying and increasing degrees of
storage arising from such use-be it incidental caching, permanent
web storage, or location by search tools such as the GoogleTM search
engine or P2P applications.
Moreover, the cavernous breadth with which the definitions of
service provider were written suggests liberal application of their
provisions. The plain reference in § 512(h) to "service provider"
betrays no limitation as to which type of service provider it should
apply. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that § 512 was
intended from the outset to protect transport providers like Verizon,
who might otherwise be liable under copyright for incidental copying;
not to protect storage providers who engage in incidental transport
services.
Accepting that as a first principle, it follows that the proximity of
§ 512(c) to § 512(h) suggests, temporally speaking, that § 512(c),
which appears first in the document, was drafted first in order to
attain the primary goal of creating safe harbors for "service
providers," and the reference back to § 512(c)(3)(A) contained later in
§ 512(h) is a simple shorthand reference, for clarity and simplicity's
sake, to the notice procedure that had already been drafted earlier in
the document.80 To conclude that the reference back to the notice
79. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1237.
80. See IA NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21:13 (6th
ed. 2002) stating:
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provision creates a limitation as to which type of service provider is
subject to compliance with the subpoena process would be to rewrite
the text of the statute. Additionally, the fact that the two subsections
are so far apart, with so much text between them, belies the
proposition that the subsections (512(c)(3)(A) and 512(h)), with the
addition of subsections 512(b) and 512(d) should be treated as
inexplicably intertwined, to the exclusion of § 512(a).
A more plausible conclusion is that, in Congress' attempt to
ensure that individuals received adequate protections against
unconstitutional invasions, the added component that the ISP must be
able to locate the file in question, was added as a procedural
safeguard before a subpoena could issue; if the ISP, looking to the
user's shared files, was unable to locate the file in question, or any
shared files at all for that matter, it could, on the user's behalf,
challenge the subpoena as suspect, or on the grounds that notice was
not properly given. 81  Such an interpretation seems to be more
consistent with a plain text reading of the statute, practicality and
common sense, and, as discussed below, Congress' stated intent that
the Act be flexible enough to meet the challenges presented by new
technology.
Therefore, as previously stated, effective notice was given and
Verizon was a service provider; hence, there was no need to engage in
the tortured interpretation that weakened the efficacy of § 512(h) by
reading into it a limitation that simply does not exist in its text. The
statute can be read to reach users engaged in § 512(a)-type activity,
There are, however, occasions where reference is necessary. This is particularly
true of long statutes. To avoid repetition, reference may need to be made to
procedures ... set forth in the same.., statute.... This incorporation of one
section into another tends toward simplicity of expression and directness of
language, which fosters clarity and incisive style.
Id. I think few would dispute that § 512 is a long statute that derives benefits in the form of
clarity and simplicity from reference back, rather than repetition of a notice procedure in
multiple locations.
81. See, e.g., In re Verizon Internet Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2003),
rev'd on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing the notice requirements of §
512(h)(2)(C) as procedural safeguards that
provide substantial protection to service providers and their customers against
overly aggressive copyright owners and unwarranted subpoenas. Indeed, they
provide greater threshold protection against issuance of an unsupported subpoena
than is available in the context of a John Doe action. And, of course, nothing in
the DMCA precludes a service provider from raising non-compliance or other
objections to a subsection (h) subpoena).
See also In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 260-63 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd
on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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and if the files cannot be located as described above (perhaps because
they have been removed before the ISP checks, or the user is offline
or not running his P2P application when the ISP attempts to check),
then notice is not properly served in that particular instance and the
subpoena would not have to be honored. This would be no different
than the case where a § 512(c)-type user storing files on his ISP's
"web storage" deletes the files after he is discovered by the copyright
holder, but before the subpoena is served upon the ISP. In that case,
the ISP would once again be unable to "locate" the infringing material
and the subpoena would simply be unenforceable, for a failure to
provide proper notice under § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii); but certainly nobody
would argue that the subpoena power simply does not apply to a
situation covered by § 512(c) because the risk of being unable to
locate the files exists.
A more narrow holding that comports with the interpretation I
have suggested would have been preferable to the result reached in
Verizon because it would address the same concern-inability to
locate the file-on a case-by-case basis, empowering copyright
holders in all instances, and leaving the text of the statute intact.
D. Legislative Intent
As to legislative intent, the court opined that Congress had no
reason to foresee the application of § 512(h) to P2P file sharing, nor
did they draft the DMCA broadly enough to reach the new technology
when it came along.82 It stated "[h]ad the Congress been aware of
P2P technology, or anticipated its development, § 512(h) might have
been drafted more generally."83 Notwithstanding Congress' inability
to specifically foresee P2P technology, however, "[a] word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used. '84 Congress, in
enacting the DMCA, was concerned that "owners [would] hesitate to
make their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable
assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy."85 A
reading of the statute that is consistent with this concern would
82. See RIAA, Inc. v. Veizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004).
83. Id.
84. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S.
60, 65 (1916)).
85. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998).
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require that § 512(h) be applied to protect copyright owners against
the single greatest current threat of such piracy-P2P file sharing.
Courts have explicitly recognized compromises embodied in the
DMCA, giving service providers protection against copyright liability
in exchange for assisting copyright owners to identify parties
infringing their works.86 Congress' intent that the DMCA be flexible
enough to embrace and be applied to new technology is clear in
Senator Leahy's statement that "[t]he DMCA is a product of the
Senate Judiciary Committee's recognition that ours is a time of
unprecedented challenge to copyright protection.... This bill is a
well-balanced package of proposals that address the needs of creators,
consumers and commerce in the digital age and well into the next
century. 8 7 A straightforward, plain text interpretation of the DMCA
that reads § 512(h) as reaching P2P users who connect through ISPs
like Verizon fully embraces Congress' intent.
86. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 274 (D.D.C. 2003), revd
on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating in dicta:
It would not be in the public interest to alter the trade-offs Congress carefully
crafted in the DMCA. As this Court has stated, "in exchange for complying with
subpoenas under subsection (h), service providers receive liability protection
from any copyright infringement.... Hence, any additional burden [on service
providers] is offset by that [liability] protection, which, of course, is exactly the
contemplation reflected in the structure of the DMCA).
See also id. n.35 ("Other courts have recognized the trade-offs embodied in the DMCA, giving
service providers copyright liability protection in exchange for assisting copyright owners to
identify infringers.") (citing ALS Scan v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
For a discussion of the history of the DMCA and ISP lobbying efforts to obtain the
protections offered by the safe harbor provisions, see Tyler T. Ochoa, 1984 And Beyond: Two
Decades of Copyright Law, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 167, 179 (2003)
(citing lrina Y. Dmitrieva, I Know It Vhen I See It: Should Internet Providers Recognize
Copyright Violation When They See !t?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 233,
244-53 (2000)). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (describing the then-new
liability standard for ISPs as being designed to preserve "strong incentives for service providers
and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take
place in the digital networked environment").
The notion underlying this reasoning, that such compromises should only be required
of ISPs who physically store infringing material, leaving other ISPs, who only provide transport,
privy to the safe harbor of § 512(a) free from the same obligation, seems inequitable.
87. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 69 (1998); see also id. at 8 (stating:
Copyright laws have struggled through the years to keep pace with emerging
technology from the struggle over music played on a player piano roll in the
1900's to the introduction of the VCR in the 1980's. With this constant evolution
in technology, the law must adapt in order to make digital networks safe places
to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials...)
(emphasis added).
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To summarize, because Verizon could have located the material
described in the subpoena, and because there is no reason to conclude
that an ISP, as a third-party, must first store something on its servers
before it can be compelled by § 512(h) to provide the identity of a
customer engaged in copyright infringement, and because such a
conclusion is consistent with Congress' intent as well as the clear text
of the statute, the subpoena could have properly issued, and the court
should have ordered its enforcement.
E. Equal Protection
Even if one were to completely accept the court's interpretation,
and agree that Congress intended to treat subscribers of ISPs who
engage in activity described by § 512(a) differently than subscribers
of ISPs engaged in activity described in § 512(b)-(d), the decision by
its own holding cannot stand, as it implicitly endorses a violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although the
words "equal protection" do not appear in the text of the Fifth
Amendment, they have been read in as a component of the due
process clause.88
An equal protection problem can arise when a law facially
discriminates between two classes of people and by its express terms
treats them differently. Traditional equal protection principles require
that only those who are similarly situated should be treated alike.89
Differences in treatment can be justified when they correspond to
relevant differences. 90 Courts should review classifications that are
not based on either suspect 91 or quasi-suspect 92 classifiers under the
minimal scrutiny standard, or rational basis review. Rational basis
review requires that the discrimination serve a legitimate state interest
88. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
"The Fifth Amendment ... does not contain an equal protection clause.... But
the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The 'equal protection of
the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process
of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable
phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id.
89. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 671 (14th ed.
2003).
90. Id.
91. "Suspect" classifications include race, alienage, and national origin, and are reviewed
under strict scrutiny.
92. "Quasi-suspect" classifications include gender and legitimacy, and are reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny.
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and that the discrimination be rationally related to the attainment of
that interest. 93  If the statute fails rational basis review, it cannot be
allowed to stand as so written, applied or interpreted.
94
The court's interpretation of § 512 facially creates two classes of
people: People who store content on their personal computer and
people who store content on the computers owned and run by their
ISPs. The two classes are similarly situated in the sense that they
both store infringing material in digital form. The difference between
the classes, where they store their infringing files, should not be
treated as a "relevant" difference for purposes of equal protection
analysis. The difference between the two classes that results from the
court's reading is that the former subscribers must be accorded notice
and opportunity to be heard, with an opportunity to contest the
issuance of the subpoenas, while the latter subscribers are guaranteed
no such protection. 95 The law, therefore, is read as facially treating
the two classes differently. Because the distinction-the location of
where the user stores his files-is not a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification, a court should review the holding under a rational basis
standard. Under rational basis review, there must be a legitimate (not
arbitrary) interest to be served by such a facially discriminatory law,
93.
The first step in determining whether legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny
is identifying a legitimate government purpose-a goal-which the enacting
government body could have been pursuing. The actual motivations of the
enacting governmental body are entirely irrelevant.... The second step of
rational-basis scrutiny asks whether a rational basis exists for the enacting
governmental body to believe that the legislation would further the hypothesized
purpose. The proper inquiry is concerned with the existence of a conceivably
rational basis, not whether that basis was actually considered by the legislative
body. As long as reasons for the legislative classification may have been
considered to be true, and the relationship between the classification and the goal
is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, the
legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny.
Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (1lth Cir. 2000) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami,
52 F.3d 918, 921-22 (11 th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
94. See, e.g., Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper
Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding that requirement of 1,000 foot spacing
between group homes for retarded adults, while no such restrictions applied to homes for other
types of families, had no rational basis to support its facial discrimination, and was thus held to
be facially invalid and its enforcement was enjoined).
95. Critics who might argue that my reading of the statute affords none of the subscribers
notice and opportunity to be heard, thereby creating a violation of the due process clause or of
the users' privacy rights, are referred to infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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and the discrimination must be rationally related to the attainment of
that interest.96
Ignoring for a moment that Congress has neither articulated an
intent to so discriminate, nor a purportedly legitimate interest in doing
so, leaving commentators to their own imaginations, the only possible
interest this author can conceive of for imposing such a distinction is
the wish to not impose upon an ISP a statutory requirement with
which it cannot comply. This interest might be argued to arise from
the belief that ISPs cannot "locate" the infringing material in a
situation covered by § 512(a). But as has already been discussed, that
interest simply does not arise on these facts, because the ISPs can
locate the material in question.
It is difficult to conceive of another state interest that might be at
play here. It certainly cannot be one of privacy, due process,
protecting a disadvantaged class, or remediation because such an
interest ought naturally extend to § 512(b)-(d)-type subscribers as
well; not just to § 512(a)-type subscribers. Because there is really no
other conceivable legitimate state interest at play here, the
discrimination would have to fail rational basis review. Therefore,
the Court's discriminatory reading of § 512 does not even rise to the
challenge of minimal scrutiny, and the statute must instead be read
and applied in a facially neutral fashion. As such § 512(h) has to be
read as reaching all ISP subscribers, or none of them. And to say that
it reaches none of them would be a plainly contrary, hence
unacceptable, reading of the text of the statute. This analysis
therefore lends further support to the argument that the Court should
have read the statute to apply to subscribers of ISPs engaged in
activity described by § 512(a).
V. CONCLUSION
Alas, the Court saw things differently. So where does that leave
us in the grand scheme of P2P litigation? P2P vendors who are wise
enough to employ distributed architectures and decentralization of all
indexing and file transfer functionality cannot be held vicariously or
contributorily liable for the copyright infringement that their
applications facilitate. Moreover, ISPs acting only as a conduit for
communications who do not store any semblance of the
communication on their own physical networks are not subject to the
DMCA subpoena provisions of § 512(h). In effect, the DMCA is
96. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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flaccid as regards copyright infringement over P2P networks and
Plaintiffs against P2P file traders have been relegated to a state of the
law that existed before § 512 was even passed, at least in the D.C.
Circuit. Certainly this is not consistent with what the drafters of the
DMCA had intended.
Does that mean that file-traders win and users are untouchable?
Not at all. The industry can still file John Doe actions against
individual P2P infringers and obtain Doe Subpoenas under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 45.97 The process, however, is more arduous
than the DMCA subpoena process: The Plaintiff must file a John Doe
action ahead of the subpoena; the Doe defendant must be given notice
of the subpoena request and must be allowed to contest the issuance
of the subpoena; the process will require the plaintiff to brief the court
and give oral argument before the judge decides whether to issue the
subpoena.98 The process will be far more time-consuming, expensive,
and burdensome for both the copyright holders and the courts than the
more streamlined filing prescribed in § 512(h), which can still be used
in situations covered by § 512(b)-(d). The result is that copyright
holders will be hobbled in their efforts to enforce their statutory rights
as against P2P file traders, the process will become more expensive
97. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
98. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 254 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd
on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Some constitutional scholars might argue
that this is good because the DMCA as a whole violates users' Constitutional due process or
privacy rights. While the notion is not expressly rejected, extended discussion is outside the
scope of this article. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (stating that the
Court "consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties"); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp.
2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (holding that when an Internet subscriber "entered into an
agreement to obtain Internet access from MindSpring, he knowingly revealed his name, address,
credit card number, and telephone number to MindSpring and its employees..." and as such had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information so provided); see also Sony Music
Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that
individuals using the Internet to download or distribute copyrighted music are engaged in
anonymous "speech" entitled to First Amendment protection, but motion to quash subpoena to
identify alleged individual infringers is denied where prima facie case of infringement is
pleaded).
For more in-depth examination of the issues, however, see Matthew Amedeo,
Comment, Shifting the Burden. The Constitutionality of Section 512(h) of the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act and Its Impact on Internet Service Providers, II COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 311
(2003), suggesting that § 512(h) is unconstitutional on First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment
grounds. Compare the reasoning in Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 248-68, concluding that
§ 512(h) does not violate Article IIl or the First Amendment, and expressly stating at pages 259-
60 that the speech involved in P2P file trading is not the type of speech protected by the First
Amendment to which a right to privacy or anonymity might attach. Neither of these analyses,
however, addresses the possible equal protection issues raised by the court's holding.
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for them, and in some cases cost-prohibitive, leading some smaller
copyright owners to acquiesce in such infringement. In the
alternative, courts may be flooded with hearings contesting the
enforcement of such subpoenas where larger plaintiffs like the RIAA
do choose to move forward.
For proponents of the reasoning in Verizon, some rhetorical
questions are offered: If, as discussed above, compliance with
§ 512(h) represents a tradeoff for the immunity provided by the safe
harbors, what precisely are ISPs seeking refuge in § 512(a) offering in
exchange? 99  Have we incentivized ISPs to offer fewer services to
consumers and to act only as passive conduits thereby stifling
innovation and the expansion of useful services? Is that consistent
with the purpose and policy of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution? Why, exactly, should the subpoena process to reach an
infringer who shares an MP3 file with the masses, by offering it for
download from a website, be different than the process required to
reach the infringer who shares the same MP3 file with the same
masses by offering it for download on a P2P network? Why should
the latter have a greater expectation of due process, privacy or equal
protection than the former? Why should the situs of the file change
the rules as between the copyright holder and the infringer? If the
answer to any of these is in the negative, then perhaps Verizon
deserves a second look. l00
99. For a discussion of the history of the DMCA and ISP lobbying efforts to obtain the
protections offered by the safe harbor provisions, see Ochoa, supra note 86 at 178. See also
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (describing the then-new liability standard for ISPs
as being designed to preserve "strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to
cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital
networked environment").
100. The RIAA has since instituted 477 additional Doe actions, 69 of which targeted users
on University networks. See New Wave of Illegal File Sharing Lawsuits Brought By RIAA,
available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/042804.asp (Oct. 22, 2004).
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Suppose an ISP is served with a subpoena alleging that one of its
subscribers at the IP address 67.115.178.246 is using BearShare
software to share copyrighted works by the artist Yngwie Malmstein,
and in particular, a file called "Classical Guitar Solo." Rather than
opening up windows explorer to browse its own internal network to
find the file, it can instead open up BearShare to browse the P2P
network. As will be demonstrated in the images that follow, the ISP
has been given information that amounts to "Identification of the
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to
be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to locate the material" as required by
§ 512(c)(3)(a)(iii). From the file menu, the ISP can select "Browse
Host."
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Fig. 2.....
A window will pop up asking for the IP address of the host it would
like to connect to.
Fig. 3
The ISP can then enter the IP address it has been given in the
subpoena and press OK.
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The ISP's BearShare application will connect to the computer that sits
at the IP address provided and query the files it has available. When
the query is done, the ISP can click on the Host.
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When the host is selected, the window on the left displays all of
the files that the computer at the stated IP address is offering for
download. The ISP has now located the allegedly infringing files on
the computer using the IP address provided by the complaining party.
If the ISP so chooses, it can download the file and listen to it, just to
make sure it is what it purports to be. It is that easy.
Because the ISP is able to terminate the user's Internet access,
thereby disabling access to the file, the requirements of § 512(c)(3)
can be satisfied.
Notably, the file information in the yellow-tinted box indicates
that the user offering this file for download is actually using
LimeWire software, and not BearShare, at the other end. This is
significant because BearShare communicates not only with BearShare
clients, but also with other software clients that operate on the
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Gnutella network. 1 Popular examples include LimeWire, Morpheus,
Mutella, Shareza, and others. This would tend to rebut the argument
that that it would be too much trouble to maintain a copy of each of
these clients in order to "locate" files, depending on which client the
alleged infringer is said to be using. Doing so is not required.
101. According to the software vendor "Bearshare lets you search for, download, and share
files with everyone on the global Gnutella peer-to-peer information network." See BearShare
4.6.0, Software Publisher's Description, CNET Download.com, at
http://www.download.com/BearShare/3000-2166_4-10295159.html?tag-lst-0-1 (last visited
Oct. 16, 2004) (copy on file with author).

